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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2982 
___________ 
 
MARIA JACQUELINE DICENT,  
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KAPLAN UNIVERSITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-17-cv-01488) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 3, 2019 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 10, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Maria Jacqueline Dicent appeals the District Court’s order granting Kaplan 
University’s (Appellee) motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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Because the parties are familiar with the background of this case, and it is 
thoroughly recited in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (R&R) 
adopted by the District Court, we will revisit the facts only briefly.  Dicent enrolled in 
online courses offered by Appellee.  As a part of the enrollment process, Dicent was 
required to log in to an enrollment portal website, where she was asked to enter various 
information necessary to become a student.  After completing this process, the enrollment 
portal generated an “Enrollment Packet” in a Portable Document Format (PDF), which 
included all of the information Dicent had provided, and also included, among other 
things, an Arbitration Agreement and Waiver of Jury Trial (Arbitration Agreement).  The 
Enrollment Packet PDF was electronically signed (e-signed) by Dicent. 
Dicent subsequently filed suit against Appellee for various causes of action.  
Appellee moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing Dicent’s claims fell within 
the Arbitration Agreement Dicent had e-signed as part of her agreement to become a 
student.  Dicent argued that she did not e-sign the Arbitration Agreement; rather, she 
maintained that Appellee never informed her of the Arbitration Agreement, and that 
Appellee never had her permission to use her e-signature for the Arbitration Agreement.  
The issue was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended granting the 
motion to dismiss and compel arbitration based on his conclusion that Dicent had failed 
to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether she assented to the Arbitration Agreement.  
After considering Dicent’s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
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R&R and entered an order to compel arbitration.  The District Court held that Dicent’s 
argument—which was offered without any supporting evidence—rested on the assertion 
that her e-signature was used without her consent.  Moreover, the District Court noted 
that Dicent had acknowledged her participation in the enrollment process, in which an e-
signature was used in order for her to become a student.  Thus, it concluded that Dicent’s 
arguments were completely contrary to the undisputed facts that the Enrollment Packet 
PDF contained the Arbitration Agreement, and that she e-signed the document. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Control Screening LLC v. 
Tech. Application & Prod. Co. (Tecapro), HCMC-Vietnam, 687 F.3d 163, 166–67 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (“Where, as here, the District Court has ordered the parties to proceed to 
arbitration, and dismissed all the claims before it, that decision is final within the 
meaning of [9 U.S.C.] § 16(a)(3)[.]” (internal quotations omitted)).  “We exercise plenary 
review over questions regarding the validity and enforceability of an agreement to 
arbitrate.”  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
When “assessing the motion to compel arbitration itself, we apply the standard for 
summary judgment in Rule 56(a),” and thus we “view the facts and draw inferences in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 
215, 219 (3d Cir. 2014).  “We apply this standard because [a] district court’s order 
compelling arbitration is in effect a summary disposition of the issue of whether or not 
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there had been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.” 1  Id. (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  Indeed, arbitration is a matter of contract; thus, if a party 
has not agreed to arbitrate, a court may not compel that party to arbitrate.  Id. at 220.  
Accordingly, we first consider “(1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate 
between the parties and, if so, (2) whether the merits-based dispute in question falls 
within the scope of that valid agreement.”  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, the only issue presented to us on appeal is whether Dicent assented to the 
Arbitration Agreement.2  “To determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we turn to 
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”  Kirleis v. Dickie, 
McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In Pennsylvania,3 “contract formation requires: (1) a mutual manifestation of 
an intention to be bound, (2) terms sufficiently definite to be enforced, and (3) 
consideration.”  Id.  Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that 
arbitration agreements “should not be extended by implication” but rather parties should 
agree to arbitration “in a clear and unmistakable manner.”  See Emmaus Mun. Auth. v. 
                                              
1 As noted in margin of the District Court’s order, Dicent had notice that the summary 
judgment standard would be used for assessing the motion to dismiss and compel 
arbitration. 
 
2 The Magistrate Judge determined that the underlying claims in the complaint fall within 
the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.  Dicent did not object to this determination, nor 
does she raise the issue on appeal. 
 
3 The parties agree that Pennsylvania state law governs here. 
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Eltz, 204 A.2d 926, 927 (Pa. 1964).  Pennsylvania, as most jurisdictions, recognizes the 
e-signature as a valid means to register legal assent.  See 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2260.301–
.312.4 
Dicent argues she “was tricked and not informed that she would be waiving jury 
trial or was entering an arbitration agreement” when she was going through the 
enrollment process.  Appellant’s Br. 2.  She maintains that she was not aware of the 
Arbitration Agreement until Appellee submitted it in the District Court, and essentially 
argues that Appellee, by including the Arbitration Agreement in the Enrollment Packet 
PDF, was employing a deceptive practice.  She argues that the “entire enrollment process 
is deceitful and the Arbitration Agreement was just simply attached without her 
knowledge and consent.”  Appellant’s Br. 6.  Thus, she contends that her e-signature is 
not valid as it pertains to the Arbitration Agreement. 
We disagree.  As the R&R thoroughly detailed, Appellee’s enrollment process 
walks prospective students through a series of steps necessary to become a student, which 
includes the production of an Enrollment Packet PDF that requires an e-signature to 
finalize the prospective student’s relationship with Appellee.  Included within this packet 
is the clearly labeled Arbitration Agreement.  In this case, Appellees presented evidence 
of Dicent’s e-signature of the documents, and Dicent herself conceded that she e-signed 
the Enrollment Packet PDF.  Thus, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material 
                                              
4 Thus, as the R&R notes, to the extent Dicent argues the Arbitration Agreement required 
her physical pen and ink signature, she is mistaken. 
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fact, as Dicent presented no evidence to contradict Appellee’s statements, other than to 
generally argue that she was unaware of the Arbitration Agreement until Appellee 
presented it to the District Court.5  See Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 735–36 
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s averment in her affidavit—that she did not 
recall seeing or reviewing the arbitration program brochure that was allegedly included 
with her payroll check—did not raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the brochure 
was distributed to her, where the record also contained uncontroverted affidavits from the 
defendant indicating that the brochure was definitely sent and presumably received with 
her paycheck).  The most reasonable inference we can draw from the evidence presented 
is that Dicent simply did not read or review the Enrollment Packet PDF closely before 
she e-signed it, which will not save her from her obligation to arbitrate.  See Standard 
Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983) (“[I]n the 
absence of proof of fraud, failure to read [the contract] is an unavailing excuse or defense 
and cannot justify an avoidance, modification or nullification of the contract or any 
provision thereof.” (internal quotations and citation omitted) (brackets in original)). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
                                              
5 Dicent maintains that she did produce evidence, arguing that her filing titled “Plaintiff’s 
Answer to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration” was an affidavit 
because she signed it.  See Dkt. #15.  Even if we did construe this filing as an affidavit, it 
is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.  See Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 161 
(noting an “affiant must set forth specific facts that reveal a genuine issue of material 
fact” and that “conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient” for this purpose 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
